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R ecently, we were asked by a mid-sized retail financial services insti-tution to assist them in constructing the investment proposal for anew customer relationship management (CRM) system. The needfor such a system had been identified during the company's latest
IT strategy process. The internal team tasked with developing this proposal had
spent the previous four months talking to senior business managers about their
requirements and expectations, attending seminars to improve their knowledge
in the CRM area as well doing the usual rounds with vendors and undertaking
reference site visits. They had also run a series of workshops with key stake-
holder groups within the organizations that would be affected by the proposed
new system. In finalizing their report to the Board, two issues sat uncomfortably
with them. First, the calculated return on investment (ROI) was insufficient to
financially justify the investment, particularly as the bank was looking for a
quick return. Second, from their conversations with management, they knew
that one of the central questions that would be posed by the Board was around
the certainty of the benefits they had identified actually being realized—and
they had no real answer to this question.
This team's predicament is not uncommon. The issues the team faced are
similar to those of any proposed IT investment, particularly those for systems
that cut right across the organization. After all the hard work of gathering data,
conducting interviews and workshops, putting it all together in a way that
makes business sense can often prove difficult, particularly in a climate where
"value for money" is the watchword. While the information technology strategy
might call for the implementation of a particular application, ensuring that the
full business value from this investment is unlocked can be problematic.
We have conducted research over the last five years investigating enter-
prise systems (ES) implementations, as well as a decade-long study exploring the
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process of unlocking business benefits from IT-enabled initiatives {see Appendix
for an overview of the research base). These lessons are valuable in helping
firms not only to assess the likelihood of identified benefits actually being real-
ized, but also in building a stronger and more realistic implementation plan.
There are many situations where a strong business case has been made for an
investment together with a well-considered ROI calculation, yet the business
benefits sought never actually materialized, despite the fact that the project was
delivered on time, within budget, and met the technical specification.
The benefits to an organization from IT-enabled change essentially
emerge from three causes: either stopping doing activities, doing what has always
being done but better (i.e., cheaper and/or faster), or doing completely new
things. If organizations are to increase the likelihood of success from their IT
investments, they must separate out the different sources of the benefits before
developing an implementation plan. Approaches to implementation will differ
depending on the nature of the change involved. From our data we have identi-
fied two distinct types of IT interventions: problem-based implementation and
innovation-based implementation. Both are likely to be present in any large-scale
IT project, but the impact on employees and other stakeholders will be quite
different and the issues that need to be managed will be very dissimilar.
Understanding the Investment Context
A key characteristic of all enterprise systems (ES)—such as CRM and ERP
(enterprise resource planning)—is that they affect a large number of organiza-
tional departments and processes, as well as external parties, such as customers
or suppliers. Their main differences from more traditional IT developments are
the ambitious intentions, the complexity of the application, its cross-functional
scope, the range of different stakeholders involved, and the extent of business
and organization changes needed to accommodate the new business model
inherent in the apphcation.' Furthermore,
there is the possibihty of bnngmg the busi- . ^ ^ ,, , • ^
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Although CRM as a software solution is a
recent concept, its tenets have been around for some time. Marketers have
always promoted building close relationships with customers and providing
them with a consistent experience.^ CRM has been difficult to achieve, however,
because many companies are organized along produa or channel lines rather
than the customer^—and legacy IT applications have often reinforced this situa-
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tion. CRM is not a product that can be purchased; it is a discipline, a framework,
and integrated approach to managing relationships with customers that requires
continuous improvement/ It is a strategy, not a tactic; and although supported
by IT, it involves considerable organizational re-design, often changing the focus
and culture of the organization.^ CRM implementation is not easy and the evi-
dence suggests that many companies are struggling with their efforts.^
By investing in a CRM system, the bank in the above example was ulti-
mately seeking to reduce costs or increase revenue, ideally both. Its strategy
called for "adding value through customer service," increasing customer loyalty,
and reducing marketing and sales expenses. Improving customer relationships
was to be achieved by improving how the bank deals with the customers, ser-
vices their accounts, and meets their needs.^ Better relationships would then
lead to more business being generated from existing customers, a decrease in the
number of defecting customers, and a reduction in the overall cost of servicing
customers.
However, to achieve these improved relationships, the bank would first
have to get to "know" their customers. The bank knew, for example, how many
accounts were held at its branches but it did not know how many customers it
had—customers could hold multiple accounts in different branches. Since its
credit card division was a separate business, they also did not know if a customer
with a checking account also had a credit card account. The bank would also
have to gain some insight inio its customers' needs and preferences so as to be
in a position to tailor its products and services to them. Staff would obviously
require training to work with this information in their interactions with cus-
tomers. Finally, there was the not insignificant problem of collecting this infor-
mation at all points of customer contact.
In business terms, what the bank was attempting to do was clearly not
something synonymous with the "quick return" that it was seeking. The two
critical issues were: building relationships with customers and increasing under-
standing and knowledge of customers.
Building relationships with customers is a process not an event. The
power in the relationship ultimately lies with the customer because if they are
unhappy with the products or level of service they receive, they are very likely
to take their business elsewhere. Repeated positive experiences generally lead
to a closer relationship and increased loyalty and ultimately generate more busi-
ness.'*^ Such experiences occur over an extended period of time as the customer
and the bank interact with each other—often over many years—although one
bad experience can effectively ruin the relationship forever. Consequently, seek-
ing a quick payback is inconsistent with the process of building customer rela-
tionships.
Improving understanding of customers requires information, which is
used to obtain a more comprehensive piaure of the firm's customers. Again,
the required information is collected over an extended period of time; no CRM
system comes with a database full of customer information. The more informa-
tion collected, the better the insights, provided the organization has requisite
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capabilities to glean new insights. However, this is often not the case.^ ^ The abil-
ity to work with information is a crucial aspect of achieving business value.'^
Operational benefits, particularly process efficiencies and cost savings,
generally emerge more rapidly. Responding quickly to customer requests and
queries can improve effectiveness as well as contribute to overall customer sat-
isfaction. One Dutch insurance company we studied justified its entire CRM
investment based solely on the savings that would be made in its personal injury
claims processing. Systems costs can also be reduced by replacing legacy systems,
which tend to have a high maintenance cost associated with them. New tech-
nologies also tend to be more flexible, opening up future options.'^
Self-service customer portals can also decrease service costs while improv-
ing customer responsiveness. Providing front-line staff with access to customer
information directly from their workstations not only improves responsiveness
to requests and the quality of their interaction with customers, but also means
that the search for information in legacy systems becomes a thing of the past,
thereby improving efficiencies. This can also improve employee satisfaction and
the impact of this on service quality can be significant.^ **
As with any IT investment, the benefits from implementing CRM soft-
ware are likely to emerge only if organizational processes are redesigned. This
task of reengineering business processes should not be underestimated—as it
often is in many ES implementations. The change in work practices that usually
accompanies any redesign can result in staff resistance if not managed appropri-
ately.'^ Many CRM projects fail to deliver the expected return due to their fail-
ure to manage the transition. For example, in retail financial services, staff have
traditionally serviced accounts or policies not customers. If front-line staff don't
accurately capture all customer information, it can undermine the CRM initia-
tive—"garbage in, garbage out" really does hold true.
A Model for Successful ES Implementation
while ES implementations are major organizational change initiatives,
soon after their initiation many default to becoming "software projeas." In one
survey of ERP projects, 89% were judged successful—the software worked and
the project was delivered close to time and cost forecasts. However, only 25%
had achieved the intended business benefits.^^ The example in Table 1 summa-
rizes the main reasons for this from the experience of one manufacturing orga-
nization. The organization implemented an ES package, from the same vendor,
twice. The first time was unsuccessful, but they realized why and had the
courage to try again, and this time they succeeded in delivering the expected
business benefits.
This company's experience is not unusual—many organizations have re-
implementing such systems to gain the benefits that were not achieved the first
time. For example, a major pharmaceutical company implemented an ES world-
wide in the 1990s across all its manufacturing units, but allowed considerable
degrees of freedom to each unit in how it "customized" and utilized the package.
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T A B L E I , Implementing Enterprise Systems: One Company's Experience
F i r st A tte m pt—Fai I u re Second Attempt—Success
Led by the IT function, with insufRcient knowledge of
the business functions concerned. Little involvement
from other business areas.
Belief that the requirements were simple and already
known ("just use the package to automate current
processes").
Led by a newly recruited manager experienced in the
business funaion. Supported from IT function.
Site visits and reviews of other companies' procedures
to establish best practice and system requirements.
Belief that this was a low-risk and straightforwvard
implementation.
Knowledge that this would require some major
changes.
Lack of business buy-in led to the old (mainly manual)
system remaining in place with little movement by the
business to adopt the new system
New procedures completely replaced the previous
system and all staff were required to use them (facilities
for the old system were withdrawn).
Little business or process change: overlaid existing
ways of working with the ES. Vendor stressed that the
flexibility of the package meant that any changes could
be made in the future.
Amendment of package, longer and more complex
system build, and difficulty applying upgrades.
Costs without benefits.
Organizational and business process changes identified
and managed from the outset.
Minimal changes to the package and innovative use of
built-in facilities. Shorter delivery timescale and easier
future upgrade paths
Benefits have exceeded expectations.
As a result, the major supply chain benefits that were expected did not accrue.
The re-implementation was more standardized and required all the units to
change their practices.
There are several perspectives of ES implementation. In some cases,
implementation is seen as a relatively straightforward and low-risk process that
can he planned and executed, without incurring significant business or organiza-
tional changes. This rarely is the case and is a rather naive view of what is a
complex process.'^ When a management team subscribes to this perspective, the
chance of the implementation being a success is severely compromised due to
unrealistic understanding of the issues involved. All too often, business prob-
lems, constraints, and management and organizational issues cause the imple-
mentation to spiral out of control, leading to large time and cost overruns and
few, if any, benefits. Ambition does not match the organization's ability to man-
age the changes associated with the project. The approach followed by the
majority of organizations that have been successful with their ES implementa-
tions is depicted in Figure 1.
Success often results from a two-phase approach to implementation.'^
The first phase creates a coherent link between the future business vision and
how the ES either shapes that vision or enables it to happen. Not surprisingly,
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F I G U R E I . A Model of a Successful Approach to Enterprise System Implementation
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the vision is often created by the vendor. Through brochures and glitzy presenta-
tions, they describe the idealized future, without any due recognition of where
the organization is coming from or what is involved in achieving it. The organi-
zation then buys into this vision, believing that it can simply purchase the path
to success. While vendors and consultants have a role, the vision must be shaped
and owned by the management team.
The first phase establishes an overall vision for how the business will
operate once the full benefits of the system are realized, setting an initial intent
that delivers a "new baseline" that addresses problems and constraints. Indeed,
studies show that business performance often deteriorates immediately after
implementation and preventative measures need to be taken—increasing inven-
tories, obtaining additional resources, and informing trading partners of expeaa-
tions.'^ The second phase of the implementation focuses on innovation in
selected processes and activities. This is where opportunities for competitive
advantage through IT are identified. It is crucial to recognize this distinction
between problem-based and innovation-based interventions in planning and
implementing ES.
W i^th problem-based implementations, the organization is primarily
investing in IT in order to:
• overcome an existing disadvantage against competitors,
• prevent performance deterioration.
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• achieve business targets, and
• remove constraints.
Examples of problem-based interventions include: integrating customer
data to provide a single point of contact for customer inquiries, implementing an
ERP system to remove reconciliation problems between production and finance,
providing employee self-service applications via a portal to reduce administra-
tion and purchasing costs, and providing lap-tops to sales people to ensure the
accuracy of customer quotations.
With innovation-based interventions, the organization is investing in IT
to exploit a business opportunity or to create competitive opportunities or new
organizational capabilities by:
• doing something new by using IT,
• doing something in a new way by using IT, and
• doing something the organization could not do before by using IT.
Innovation is dependent on the combination of the technology, the orga-
nization's technical expertise, and the ability of the organization to change in
order to make effective use of the new capabilities.^"^ Examples include: creating
an on-line sales channel to reach new customers, introducing vendor managed
inventory for key suppliers, allowing customers to do self-billing, deploying a
data warehouse and analytics to automate operational decision making, and
introducing mobile technologies for professionals to work online during client
engagements.
Reconciling the Logic of ES with the Business Vision
At the start of the initiative, the main issue is how the "vision" of the ES
implementation fits with the business vision, with a clear understanding of how
the ES implementation contributes to realizing the vision. There are two possi-
bilities:
• The implementation of the ES will provide the new business model on
which the vision is based—this generally implies that major business and
organizational changes will be needed.
• The business model to achieve the vision is known and the ES is required
to make it operational—this implies that there will be trade-offs between
the ideal model and the business model embedded in the logic of the ES
software.
Most implementations are likely to be a mixture of these two possibilities.
Clarity is needed concerning where the ES business model and associated func-
tionality will drive organizational changes. The organization must identify those
areas where the organization's business model cannot be compromised, perhaps
due to the market advantage that it provides. A cause of some ES implementa-
tion failures is that the business model is not understood and the organization
adopts processes and systems that do not fit the business model. This will tend
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to produce changes to the ES software during the implementation in order to
reproduce the old business model.
Attempting to resolve the current and future business models often high-
light a major disconnect between the strategic intent of implementing the sys-
tem and the resulting actions that must be completed.-' One UK bank had
difficulty in getting branch staff involved in defining requirements during their
CRM project. Senior management's vision of the project was built around cus-
tomer retention and cross-selling. Branch staff, on the other hand, just wanted
a system to process transactions speedily and to get the customer out of the
branches as quickly as possible. Getting appropriate engagement and buy-in
proved difficult and progress was laborious at times. Yet, after the system had
been up and running for a year, staff began to see what was possible and became
very active in making suggestions for further development.
Establish the Initial ES Vision and Intent
As planning commences, the problems and constraints become more
apparent and the intent of the implementation has to be scaled back to "a new
baseline." It is difficult to put a new vision into operation when engulfed by
current problems."^^ Problem-driven implementation is actually easier to manage
than that driven by innovation. It is easier to measure the success; even if the
benefits are more limited, they are probably visible soon after implementation.
Again, this ability to measure the benefits may reduce the goals to those that
can easily be identified, agreed on, and quantified. However, such a compromise
may well lead to overall disappointment since the benefits achieved by problem
removal rarely justify the expense of an ES.
Shakedown
With any ES implementation there is inevitably some form of a "shake-
down" phase."' This may include resolving serious problems if business perfor-
mance has been adversely affected, or merely tuning the system and business
processes to achieve the expected performance levels. Any implementation
should anticipate and plan for this stage, ensuring resources and procedures are
in place to deal with the consequences of implementation. During this shake-
down phase, a clear understanding must be established of how to optimize per-
formance through further changes to business processes and praaices and how
further benefits can be achieved through software re-configuration.
This shakedown phase is a pivotal time during the life of any ES projea.
It is during this phase that there is risk of the projea spiraling out of control—
soaking up cash but failing to deliver any benefits—or being abandoned alto-
gether. Performance improvement during this shakedown phase arises from
either: internal rationalization of current information {improving its quality);
or integration of internal processes and changes to external processes {whether
through the creation of new processes or the redesign of current processes).
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T A B L E 2. Key Issues in ES Implementation
To succeed, business models will have to change and so will business and organizational relationships.
It is the business changes enabled by the ES application that produce the major and lasting business benefits.
There must be explicit!/ identified benefits both to the corporation and to the functional units involved in order
to enable the business changes, However; implementing an ES system will rarely deliver sufficient immediate
benefits to justify the cost and effort Exploiting the new capability will deliver further benefits.
Corporate IT initiatives are often distrusted by the business units or functions due to perception of increased
centralized control and loss of autonomy.
The technology is rarely the cause of failure; it is normally the result of organizational issues being unresolved
or a poor implementation process.
ES projects often have an imposed deadline that can seriously affect the likelihood of success. Figure out the
requirements of the project first, then determine how long it is likely to accomplish them.
Poorly defined or ineffectively communicated business vision and strategy will reduce the ES project to a
technology project only, owned by the IT function.
Most organizations realize (after the event) that more resources and expertise should have been dedicated to
managing the changes.
Onwards and Upwards
Once a new or revised intent is established, a new stage of planning and
implementation, often in smaller steps, can be carried out. This "onwards and
upwards" stage focuses more on innovation and is only feasible in discrete steps,
if business risks are to be avoided."'* It is important that organizational knowl-
edge gained during the first implementation is retained and transferred to this
second phase.
Avoiding a Protracted and Difficult Shakedown Phase
Implementing an ES is a business transformation program, not merely
a technical project. Few fail because of the inadequacies of the technology, but
rather because of different perceptions by senior executives, management, and
functional units as to the extent of organizational changes. Successful imple-
mentations have usually been carefully, even slowly, planned to gain the under-
standing and commitment of all the stakeholders. Often, two-thirds of the
project duration was planning and one-third was implementation. Many failures
result from a short planning phase, during which few of the differences in per-
ceptions across stakeholder groups were addressed or reconciled. Table 2 con-
tains a summary of some of the key issues that need to be addressed in relation
toES.
Understanding and Addressing the Different
Perspectives that Influence an ES Implementation
Successful ES implementations involve the management of many diverse
interest groups and the adoption of different approaches to the management
of project activities and business changes. The different interest or stakeholder
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groups are unlikely to be fixed in their views about what they want and what
the ES project can deliver. In reality, people's views tend to adjust as they learn
more about the nature of change and how the change affects them and other
people.
Within organizations, individual attitudes and perceptions are primarily
influenced by four factors:
• Roles and Responsibilities—^As a person moves, for example, from middle to
senior management role, he or she will need to pay attention to different
problems, information, and people when framing problems and making
decisions.
• Information Asymmetry—Employees have access to different sources of
information about change projects and, consequently, must form their
views about a planned change using information of varying completeness,
accuracy, and reliability. Never mistake resistance for ignorance that
results from lack of communication.
• Professional Background—Inevitably, professional background and expertise
have a major bearing on how individuals perceived change. An IT profes-
sional, for example, will appreciate an IT project's technical complexity
more than an accountant or HR manager.
• Personal Interests—The impacts of a project on personal interests will also
affect how the individual perceives a change process. A software engineer,
for example, may see a project as an opportunity to develop marketable
skills and, consequently, will argue in favor of using novel hardware and
software.
These factors, combined with group interests, can result in both individu-
als and groups having different views of how a project will affect the organiza-
tion during and after implementation. From a change management perspective,
it is particularly important to understand how these factors affect people's per-
ceptions of the resource demands a project will place on the organization and
the change effort required for successful implementation.
Typically, the planning of an enterprise systems project often occurs "top-
down." Senior management identifies business problems or opportunities they
believe will be addressed by an enterprise system. A program or project manager
is then appointed to plan and implement an ES project. Finally, line managers
and end users are consulted regarding the design and rollout of ES components
in their business areas.
In the majority of cases, this top-down approach proves unsatisfactory
and project managers find themselves under considerable pressure to complete
implementation rapidly, while also receiving demands from users for systems
changes. Figure 2 illustrate their contrasting perception of resource demands and
the required change effort.
• Senior managers typically have two key concerns: financial performance
and ensuring the business will be competitive in the future. They also
have limited exposure to the complexities of day-to-day operations.
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F I G U R E 2 . Diverse Perspectives of Stakeholders: Reaching Consensus
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Consequently, they tend to focus on keeping costs and resource usage to a
minimum, while having limited understanding of the practical barriers to
translating their high-level strategic change plans into reality.
Project managers appreciate the complexity of large change projects and
are more aware of the uncertainty surrounding implementation. As they
expect to encounter unforeseen difficulties, they will tend to overestimate
resource demands to give themselves a margin for error and to build in
some slack. Depending on the professional background of the project
manager, his or her initial estimate of the change effort is likely to be
relatively low, as project managers will probably not be fully aware of the
practical constraints on project implementation, particularly around the
people issues."^^
Line managers are very familiar with their part of day-to-day operations.
Their time is consumed ensuring the business runs smoothly and tackling
operational problems as they arise. Any attempts to change operational
processes are likely to be seen as increasing their already heavy workload,
as well as introducing operational risks. Hence, they often see large
change programs, such as ES implementations, as requiring a consider-
able change effort. However, they usually have little knowledge of the
costs of buying, implementing, and operating new information systems
until they are made explicit.
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These differences in roles, professional expertise, and personal agendas
are likely to cause senior, projea, and line managers to have very different per-
ception of ES projects. Even among their ranks, there may be diverse perspec-
tives. The top-down approach to defining ES change places the projea manager
in a difficult position, being pulled in different directions by different individuals
and interest groups. These differences can make it almost impossible for a projea
manager to implement a change project without encountering significant oppo-
sition, which is extremely difficult to resolve.
The introduction of new IT systems can provoke different behaviors
(depending on its impaa on different groups) and can exacerbate existing
behaviors. In essence, the behaviors with respect to IT tend to fall into one of
three modes:^^
• Rational—all stakeholders subscribe to the same organizational goals and
focus on achieving those goals through effective and efficient use of IT.
• Trust—a wilUngness of (some) stakeholders to aa in concert to ensure
mutually supported goals can be achieved through IT without serious
detriment to any stakeholder interest.
• Self-Interest—stakeholders pursue their personal agendas/interests and use
IT to protect their positions, often constraining the organizational use or
even undermining it.
It is important in an ES implementation to recognize that all three of
these modes will exist, probably concurrently, among the stakeholders. While
senior managers are more likely to subscribe colleaively to the rational view,
they have to accept that there will be those who have vested interests to protect
and also that existing relationships among some stakeholders are a source of
power for either beneficial change or resistance. Existing relationships are likely
to be the result of the existing business model, hence the extent of change to the
business model caused by the ES is an important consideration—the less change,
the more existing relationships are a positive attribute and vice versa.
Each stakeholder—whether an individual, group, or a whole business
unit—also needs to be considered in terms of the extent to which they perceive
the projea producing benefits for them relative to the amount of change they
will have to undergo or endure before the benefits are likely to accrue. Some
form of resistance can be expected if they perceive that the changes outweigh
the benefits or if stakeholders have to endure significant change for no direa
benefit. Such resistance could cause major projea risks." Based on the current
positioning of each stakeholder and the required level of resources or support
they need to provide, an action plan to move their perceptions or deal with their
concerns can usually be devised. However, in some cases the gap may be too
great and the ambitions for the project should be reduced to enable at least some
of the benefits to be realized. Whether substantial additional action is justified or
it is better to reduce the investment scope depends on the number and value of
the particular benefits that the stakeholder "resistance" may affea.
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It is during the shakedown phase that the impact of changes—shaped
and enabled by the IT system on roles and relationships—^become apparent. New
process designs will inevitably mean changes in work practices and the roles of
employees. The consequences and acceptance of these changes dictates the out-
come of the shakedown phase. Similarly, new relationships are created and
established ones disbanded. New roles and relationships have an inevitable
impact on intra-organizational coordination.^** These new roles and relationships
are often pre-requisites for generating the new thinking essential for innovation,
whereas the knowledge required to resolve known problems normally exists in
current relationships.
If significant change to the existing business model is required, new trust-
ing stakeholder relationships need to be formed early in the project, based on
the business model envisaged. Otherwise, it is likely that—as existing relation-
ships and trust are broken up by the anticipated changes—all the stakeholders
will revert to self-protection and self-interest will become the dominant behav-
ior. There are inter-relationships among stakeholders and stakeholder groups
that can either be a major enabler or inhibitor of an ES implementation. Figure
3 demonstrates how the modes affect the two-stage approach to
implementation:
• At the start of the planning stage an overall rational view of the business
and ES models and benefits expected should be behind the process (posi-
tion "a" in Eigure 3), but more detailed planning will normally be affected
by existing trust and relationships among stakeholders. What must be
avoided is a rapid descent into self-interest when individual stakeholders
defend the status quo, normally by adding to the "constraints" (position
"b" in Eigure 3).
• While the rationale for any changes must be reinforced throughout the
project by re-iteration of the benefits, the implementation of the changes
will, to a large extent, inevitably be localized. There will be trade-offs
made to balance local and shared interests, based on the relationships
among the different stakeholder groups.
• Eollowing implementation, the duration and issues encountered in the
shakedown phase will be partly dependent on how each stakeholder
group has fared in terms of actual and perceived benefits in relation to
the changes. If the implementation has not gone well, there is likely
to be a period of self-protection and loss of trust, as relationships are
stressed. If the new system "doesn't work," the stakeholders at the
"sharp-end" (where the business operations can suffer most) are likely
to be the most protective to avoid bringing the business "to its knees" for
a period (position "c" in Eigure 3).
• Before the onwards and upwards innovation stage can proceed, not
only does a new rationale for the future vision have to be in place, but
also new relationships and trust among key stakeholder groups need
to be in place to operationalize the future vision. Protective behaviors
based on local interests need to have ceased, either through attention
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F I G U R E 3. ES Implementation and Changing Organizational Modes
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to the specific issues causing the behavior during the shakedown phase or
by other compensatory changes to mitigate the negative effects (position
"d" in Figure 3).
While all these attitudes will probably exist at the start of the project, how
the project is set up in terms of leadership and involvement will have a signifi-
cant influence on how behaviors evolve. The changes that produce the ES bene-
fits inevitably lead to greater interdependence of business activities by removing
the (logically) unnecessary reconciliation and control activities across processes
and functional boundaries. The clarity of the business case for the ES, in both
operational and strategic terms (i.e., how rational it is) is critical to achieving
buy-in both collectively and individually by key stakeholders. However, given
the trade-offs that will inevitably be required between different groups in terms
of changes and benefits, the degree of trust in existing organizational relation-
ships must be maintained and utilized in defining how the first phase of the
implementation will be achieved.
The Two-Phase Approach:
Implications for the Return on Investment Curve
The benefits of an ES do not come ail at once when the system goes
"live"—as noted, performance often dips in the early days and months.^^ The
nature of the benefits available will vary over the life of the project. For exam-
ple, our analysis indicates that the ROI curve for CRM shows little return in the
early days of the investment. However, over a period of several years, through
increasing customer insight and improving relationships, the payback can be
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F I G U R E 4. The Return on Investment Curve: An Example from a CRM Implementation
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significant. This curve should be considered in putting together any investment
proposal for any ES.
Figure 4 illustrates the generic profile of the curve for a CRM implemen-
tation—it will vary from organization to organization, influenced not least
because of their differing starting positions. In the early days and months of the
program, benefits are likely to be as a result of solving current problems, gener-
ally improving efficiencies and improving information quality. For example, in
an insurance company we studied, mobile sales agents were an important distri-
bution channel but were acting as an information sieve. The agents had direa
access to a rich source of customer details, but neglected to communicate much
of this information to the headquarters, call center, and other back-office func-
tions. A promise from them to deliver more information on a product or fresh
leads generated while with a client was often forgotten, as there was not a
mechanism in place to capture and route this information to appropriate depart-
ments. However, through the implementation of sales force automation, the
sales force could share information with others in the organization, solving a
problem that had long plagued them. They have now created a revised vision for
CRM that is more innovation-based and focuses more on the customer rather
than on solving an organizational problem.
Once current problems have been addressed, innovation-based activity
can be undertaken, which can result in significant returns. For example, wdth
improvements in customer information, market segmentation can be improved.
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propensity to purchasing modeling undertaken, and marketing activity more
focused. One UK bank saw its response rates for marketing campaigns increase
from 2% to more than 40%—but this was 3 years after it first began its CRM
initiative. It attributed this to greater customer insight.
These arguments call into question the figures that are continually tossed
around regarding the failure rate of CRM. For example, industry analysts Gan-
ner calculate that 65% of CRM projects failed in 2001.^^ In assessing such find-
ings it is important to consider the timeframe over which the so-called "failed"
projects are being assessed. It might just be that within a short time-scale the
expected benefits were not delivered—but as pointed out above, how could they
be?
One particular life assurance company assessed its CRM implementation
to be a moderate success when it first introduced it five years ago, and indeed at
one stage considered replacing it. A post-implementation ROI analysis indicated
that the investment was showing little return compared to the figures in the
investment proposal. Recently, however, they were voted "best company to deal
with" in a nationwide survey of brokers, its principal charmel to market. Income
has increased threefold over the last two years and the level of expense incurred
to service this business has also been reduced dramatically. Further evidence is
provided by the Britannia Building Society, who in 2002 scooped up an award
for best CRM implementation in financial services. While it is now receiving
accolades, the Society in fact began its CRM initiative all the way back in 1995.31
Realizing Value: A Journey Not a Destination
The issues faced by the bank, as outlined in the beginning of this article,
involve recognizing that CRM is a long-term investment in both business and
technical terms. It is not only about building a customer knowledge base for the
organization to exploit, but also about building listening and responding mecha-
nisms and sharing some of the value derived from that information with the
customer. Often, its success depends on customers changing their behaviors. In
short, expecting a quick payback is inconsistent with the requirements necessary
for successfully building relationships with customers. The investment must
therefore be assessed in this light; unfortunately few are. It may be that conven-
tional approaches to calculating ROI are inappropriate for expressing expected
returns and providing the justification for investments in IT.
Furthermore, organizations must continually work to achieve benefits
and this requires the active engagement and involvement of both business
management and users. This requires the construction of a benefits realization
plan, detailing the source of the benefits, responsibilities for making changes,
and timescales for achievement.^^ An ES implementation is, in essence, a sig-
nificant organizational change initiative and any such intervention is best
viewed as a two-phase process, which emphasizes the critical importance of
managing through the "shakedown" phase of the project. Approaches to imple-
mentation will differ depending on whether the intervention is problem-based
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or innovation-based. Failure to recognize this distinction may mean that any
value realized will be sub-optimal. Finally, realizing value is a journey not a
destination.
APPENDIX
About the Research
This article is based on three related research projects conducted at the
Information Systems Research Centre at Cranfield School of Management.
The first is a longitudinal study that has explored how organizations can
unlock business benefits and value from their investments in IT. The researchers
worked with companies including Alliance & Leicester, AstraZeneca, The
NatWest Bank, GlaxoSmithKline, British Energy, and British Telecom. The key
findings of the study can be found in John Ward and Joe Peppard, Strategic Plan-
ning for Information Systems, 3rd Edition (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2002)
and John Ward and Elizabeth Daniel, Benefits Management: Delivering Value from IS
and IT Investments (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2005).
The second is a study of CRM projeas in a variety of different organiza-
tions. Case studies were undertaken in 15 companies: Canada Life, Orange, Der-
byshire Building Society, Britannia Building Society, The NatWest Bank, Friends
First, Homebase, Reaal Particulier, Electrocomponents, Siemens, Nortel
Networks, Sears, Roebuck and Company, Aserta Homes, Wesleyan Assurance
Society, and Sun Microsystems. The findings of this study have been published
in Simon Knox, Stan Maklan, Adrian Payne, Joe Peppard, and Lynette Ryals,
Customer Relationship Management: Perspectives from the Marketplace (Oxford: Butter-
worth-Heinemann, 2003).
The third project is a study of the particular change and organizational
issues associated with the successful deployment of enterprise systems. The
scope of the project included all types of enterprise-wide systems. In-depth case
studies were undertaken in AstraZeneca, Qinetiq (formerly the UK's Defense
Establishment Research Agency), Electrocomponents, and Mitel. The findings
are published in J. Ward, C. Hemingway, and E. Daniel, "A Framework for
Addressing the Organizational Issues of Enterprise System Implementation,"
Journal of Strategic Information Systems (2005).
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